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INTRODUCTION

What religion first comes to mind when thinking of Moses hiking to
a mountaintop to receive affirmation of the covenant the Hebrews
made with God by receiving God's rules? What about a religion that
traces its heritage back to Abraham? At this point, most people in
this country would likely think of Christianity first; many of those people would probably recognize that these facts also describe Judaism.
What if believing that Jesus was a prophet were added to the given
facts? The answer now is obviously Christianity, right? Wrong.
These three facts most closely identify with Islam.1
The Author of this Comment has two compelling beliefs; first, Jesus
Christ is the Son of God, and the only way to God is through Jesus.'
Second, the Author also believes that had he been born in Saudi Arabia, he would believe that Allah is the one and only God, and that
Mohammad is one of his prophets.3
What does this have to do with a paper about the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence? First, it hopefully serves as a
rather snazzy, but relevant, attention-getter. More importantly, it
should demonstrate that there is an inherent bias toward Christianity
in this country,4 and that fact should be taken into consideration any
time one attempts to derive the meaning of the Establishment Clause,
as it may cloud a person's vision of the protection the Clause affords,
through forsaking those protections at the expense of one's own biases. However, at the same time, one must engage in somewhat of a
balancing act by recognizing the previous statement's relationship

1. Both Christian and Islam scriptures say that Moses received God's covenant
with the Hebrews. See Exodus 24:1-8 (King James); 'Abdullah Yfisaf 'All, The Meaning of the Holy Qur'An 27-28, 30, 34 (new ed., 1997). Both religions trace their heritage back to Abraham. See Genesis 12:1-7 (King James); 'Abdullah Yfisaf 'All, The
Meaning of the Holy Qur'An 54, 842 (new ed., 1997). The scripture of both religions
refer to Jesus as a prophet. See John 6:14 (King James); 'Abdullah YFisaf 'All, The
Meaning of the Holy Qur'An 40, 55 (new ed., 1997). However, the Christian scriptures dispel the notion that Jesus was only a prophet. See, e.g., John 1 (King James).
2. This is what many consider the foundation of the Christian religion. See, e.g.,
John 3:16, 14:6 (King James).
3. See, e.g., GEORGE ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY: SEVEN INTRODUCTIONS TO NON-WESTERN THOUGHT 175 (2002).
4. If this were insufficient to show that there is an inherent bias toward Christianity in the United States, see generally Matthew L. Fore, Note, Shall Weigh Your God
and You: Assessing the ImperialisticImplications of the InternationalReligious Freedom Act in Muslim Countries, 52 DUKE L.J. 423 (2002). A good example of the historical bias toward Christianity in the United States is that nine of the thirteen
colonies had state-established religions (of course, at the time, that was permissible, as
the Establishment Clause had yet to be incorporated to the states). James E. Wood,
Jr., New Religions and the First Amendment, in RELIGION AND THE STATE 185, 188
(James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1985). The Court has recognized the bias, and claimed that it
should be done away with. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985).
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with the indisputable fact that this country was founded on Christian
religious principles.5
Contrary to what most people seem to believe,6 the language "Separation of Church and State" appears nowhere in the Constitution.7
In the words of then Justice Rehnquist:
There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the
Framers intended to build the "wall of separation" that was constitutionalized in Everson.
...

The "wall of separation between church and State" is a meta-

phor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as
a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.8
Most likely, what many people are referring to when thinking of "Separation of Church and State" is the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.9 The first provision of the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."1 The first part of
the provision1 1 is commonly referred to as the Establishment Clause."
The second part of the provision' 3 is known as the Free Exercise
Clause. 4 Because both Clauses interact with one another, it is difficult to discuss one without implicating the other."5 For this reason,
5. See Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212 (1963).
6. See generally, DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF SEPARATION 41 (3d ed. 1992)
(David Barton's fascinating book traces the true relationship between church and
state in detail, and demonstrates that the "wall of separation" is nothing more than a
mere "myth.").
7. See U.S. CONST.
8. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
9. Most people agree that the purpose of these two clauses is to, "[Aissure the
separation of church and state in a nation characterized by religious pluralism." JESSE

H.

CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-QuEsTIONS

1033

(9th ed. 2001). The Supreme Court has often used the language since it first chose to
do so in 1878. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). But as a matter of
accuracy, one should be aware that such language is not part of the Constitution. The
language actually comes from a letter dated January 1, 1802, written by Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association in which he was attempting to explain the First Amendment. Philip Hamburger, Separation and
Interpretation, 18 J.L. & POL. 7, 7 (2002). Furthermore, the current Chief Justice has
said, the wall of separation "has proved all but useless as a guide to sound constitutional adjudication. It illustrates only too well the wisdom of Benjamin Cardozo's
observation that '[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."' Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. R. Co., 155
N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926)).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1-2.
11. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.

12.

CHOPER ET AL.,

supra note 9, at 1033.

13. "[O]r prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl.2.

14.

CHOPER ET AL.,

supra note 9, at 1033.

15. Id.
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while this Comment is geared toward
the Establishment Clause, one
16
should be aware of the overlap.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence has yielded a rather schizophrenic view of how the Establishment Clause should be applied.1 7
While the Court has developed multiple tests to determine whether an
act or symbol violates the Establishment Clause,18 it has never
adopted a clear test.1 9
In the 38 years since Everson our Establishment Clause cases have
been neither principled nor unified. Our recent opinions, many of
them hopelessly divided pluralities, have with embarrassing candor
conceded that the "wall of separation" is merely a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier," 20which "is not wholly accurate" and can
only be "dimly perceived.",

For example, while the Court has credited the so-called Lemon test as
being the primary operative test,2 ' it has often implied that the oftcriticized Lemon test is insufficient and instead replaced it with a different test to reach a result contrary to what the Lemon test would
have yielded. 2 All of this mayhem only to later revive the Lemon test
from its dormant state-whenever convenient-as stated by Justice
Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District,2 3 "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and
school attorneys .... 4
16. This interaction has led to interesting viewpoints on how each of the clauses
should be interpreted in order to function together. For example, the legendary Professor Tribe has argued that the Free Exercise Clause should be viewed broadly, while
the Establishment Clause should be viewed narrowly. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 826-33 (1978).
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 869 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(commenting that "[i]n all the years of its effort, the Court has isolated no single test
of constitutional sufficiency").
20. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971)).
21. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at
688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (applying the 3-prong Lemon test in examining the
right of a city to place a nativity scene in its Christmas display).
22. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-93 (1989) (applying
the endorsement test instead of the Lemon test); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (admitting
that the Court has decided Establishment Clause cases without ever applying the
Lemon test, claiming that a single test would be insufficient).
23. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
24. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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But the conflict does not stop with scaring only children and attorneys. Attorneys should at least know that the Lemon test, or at least
some variation of it, is the operative test and will be applied-unless
of course it will not. What about the lower courts? Lacking clear direction, the lower courts commonly apply all the tests the Court has
used.2 5 That would not be so bad, except for the small problem that
the tests do not always yield the same result, leaving the lower courts
to try to manipulate one or more of the tests in order to reach the
same result under all of them.26 The Fifth Circuit called the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence "rife with confusion." 7 Such a
statement seems to be true, as the lower courts have split on cases
involving similar facts, but for some rather odd reasons.28
And what about the state legislators? After all, the Establishment
Clause does apply to states.2 9 The Court has proclaimed the purpose
of the Establishment Clause "was to state an objective, not to write a
statute."3 Surely that is true, as the Establishment Clause is obviously not a statute, but a part of the Constitution. 3 1 But state legislators are faced with the task of writing statutes, which obviously should
comport with all parts of the Constitution. This task must be difficult
considering the fact that they lack the luxury of guidance, at least inso-

25. This is a concept the Court has itself noted. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793, 804, 808 (2000).
26. See, e.g., Newdow v. United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002),
rev'd Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (mem.)
(manipulating, as some might argue, all of the tests, but at least the coercion test, in
holding that the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance are unconstitutional).
This case was reversed by the Supreme Court on standing grounds. Id. at 2304. See
generally Laura A. Bowers, Note, M.C.L. v. Florida: A Vignette of the Inconsistencies
Plaguing Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,27 STETSON L. REV. 1437 (1998) (discussing the inconsistent rulings resulting from the Supreme Court's failure to overrule
previous decisions regarding the Establishment Clause). See infra Part III for a hypothetical that demonstrates this concept.
27. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 1999).
28. For an example of this conflict, compare Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County,
334 F.3d 247, 249-51 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a Pennsylvania courthouse may
continue to display an 83-year-old plaque of the Ten Commandments), with Glassroth
v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Chief Justice of the
State of Alabama must remove a 5,280-pound display of the Ten Commandments he
had installed in the rotunda in the Alabama State Judicial Building). It has been
suggested that one of the primary reasons the Third Circuit allowed the display to
remain, was because of the age of the object on which the Ten Commandments was
written! See Stephanie Francis Ward, In with the Old, Out with the New, 2 No. 26
A.B.A. J. E-Report 1 (July 3, 2003).
29. The actual Establishment Clause, that is, the first clause in the First Amendment, was incorporated to the states in 1947. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
14-15 (1947). The Free Exercise Clause was incorporated to the states in 1940. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
30. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
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far as consistency is concerned, from the Court on what is or is not
permissible under the Establishment Clause.32
If the Court is unwilling to pick a clear test and stick with it because
the Establishment Clause does not lend itself to being interpreted

through only one test, as it claims,3 3 then it should at least set forth
clear circumstances under which each test would be applied. This
would provide what one could describe as much needed and appreciated consistency for lower courts to base their decisions on, for legisla-

tures, who undoubtedly have an interest in authoring statutes that are
constitutional, and for attorneys who are representing clients in cases
arising under the Establishment Clause.
The purpose of this Comment is not to suggest a new test for Establishment Clause jurisprudence-there are plenty of well-known scholars who have been engaged in such a task, some for over thirty
years.3 4 Instead, this Comment will draw an analogy between the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and other regions of the
Court's jurisprudence, and recommend a similar approach be taken by
the Court in this area in a manner that would bring order to chaos, yet
maintain the flexibility the Court desires. Part II discusses the modern approach to issues arising under the Establishment Clause, which
includes the modern tests and their origin. Part III explores the
problems these multiple approaches have created. Part IV addresses

the need for consistency. The circumstantial approach is introduced
and discussed in Part V, which is followed by the conclusion in Part
VI.
II.

THE MODERN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS AND

THEIR ORIGIN

A.

History and Theory

The Court had little opportunity to interpret the Establishment
Clause until the mid-twentieth century.

Before this time, few people

32. See infra Part IV.
33. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (admitting that the Court
has decided Establishment Clause cases without ever applying Lemon, claiming that a
single test would be insufficient).
34. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools, 56 CAL. L. REV. 260, 261 (1968). See also Kristin M. Engstrom, Comment,
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The Souring of Lemon and the Search for a New
Test, 27 PAC. L.J. 121 (1995) (encouraging the resolution of Establishment Clause
cases through the application of set standards).
35. See Elizabeth A. Harvey, Casenote, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education: Squeeze the Lemon Test Out of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,10 GEO.
MASON L. REV., 299, 302 (citing 2 MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 462 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992)). Prior to 1947, the Court decided only two

cases in which it conducted an examination of the Establishment Clause. See Quick
Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908): Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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were bothered by prayers and the teachings of Christian beliefs.3 6 In
the 1940s, religious diversity began to emerge, likely due to the prior
influx of immigrants to the U.S. 7 In 1947, the Court first applied the
Establishment Clause to the states using the process of selective incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.3 8 It was about this
time that the Court began to frequently be called upon to interpret
the Establishment Clause.3 9
Many of the Establishment Clause cases addressed by the Court
have dealt with religion's relationship to the quasi-governmental institution of public schools.4" Other cases have dealt with religious symbols in government buildings or on government property, or religious
symbols set up by the government. 4 1 A variety of similar cases have
been dealt with only in the lower courts.4"
The Court has developed four unique tests, or at least principles, for
interpreting the Establishment Clause: the Lemon test,4 3 the endorsement test,4 4 the coercion test,4 5 and the neutrality principle. 46 Each
test is discussed in detail below, in Part II.B-E.
36. Harvey, supra note 35, at 302 (citing 2 MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN CON462 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992)).
37. Harvey, supra note 35, at 302 (citing 2 MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 462 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992)). Modernly, it has been noted
that this country "boasts more than 55 different religious groups and subgroups with a
significant number of members." Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 723
(2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
38. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947). Justice Thomas, however,
has recently questioned whether this should have occurred. Zelman, 536 U.S. at
676-84 (Thomas, J., concurring).
39. Harvey, supra note 35, at 302 (citing 2 MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 463 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992)).
40. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (dealing with
student-led and student-initiated prayers before football games); Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1993) (dealing with afterhours access to public school facilities for religious purposes); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 580-81 (1987) (dealing with a requirement to teach the concept of creation in addition to evolution in public schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971) (dealing with financial assistance for secular activities in private schools); Sch.
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (dealing with Bible reading and
recitation of the Lord's prayer in public schools); Newdow v. United States Congress,
292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (dealing with requirement of daily recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance, which uses the words "under God").
41. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,*578-82 (1989) (dealing
with a creche depicting a nativity scene placed in the county courthouse and a
Chanukah menorah placed outside City-County Building); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984) (dealing with the city setting up a nativity scene in a park owned by a
non-profit organization).
42. See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 355 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (dealing with a
display of the Ten Commandments in the rotunda in the Alabama State Judicial
Building); Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999)
(dealing with a disclaimer adopted by the school board which required a reading of a
disclaimer before teaching evolution in public schools).
43. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602, 612-13.
44. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-93.
STITUTIONAL HISTORY
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Before the tests are discussed in detail, a surface-scratching introduction to the basic theories of thought should prove helpful. The
theoretical view points on the Establishment Clause can be broken
down into two large and somewhat murky classes,

7

which will be re-

ferred to collectively as the theoretical views. The first is the broad
view, sometimes called the strict-separationalist or neutrality approach (the kind sanctioned by persons such as Justice Souter), which
seeks to prevent any aid to religion." The adherents of this approach
tend to look to Jefferson's view of "Separation of Church and State"
for support.49 The key to this broad view is that it demands not only a
strict-separation of religion and government, but it also deems neutrality toward religion as an essential feature intended by the founders
of this Country. 0
The second theoretical view, the narrow view, often called the accomodationalist approach, (a view sanctioned by persons such as
Chief Justice Rehnquist) also looks to history, but reasons that none
of the framers ever claimed that the government must be neutral, and
that such a reading would be at odds with the Free Exercise Clause. l
Instead, adherents of this view give the term "establish" a literal
meaning, and reason that the government cannot discriminate among
religions.52 Thus, under the broad view, the government need not be
neutral toward religion; it need only refrain from differentiating
amongst various religions. 3
The broad view has dominated the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.5 4 Although recently, the Court has modified some of
the rules which came from the broad view by interposing some of the
ideas captured in the narrow view.55 There are fractional subparts of
both of these theoretical views, which are seen in the various approaches the Court has employed in an attempt to interpret the Establishment Clause. 6 Different justices have become associated with the
various theoretical views. For example, Justices Souter, Stevens, and
45. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
46. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
839 (1995).
47. DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL IrNrNrr 46 (1991).
48. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 867-68 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also DAVIS, supra note 47, at 48.
49. Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in
Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. Rev. 503, 507-08 (1990).
50. See Engstrom, supra note 34, at 124 (citing Robin W. Lovin, Rethinking the
History of Church and State, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1185, 1193 (1988) (book review)).
51. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 48-49. For example, preventing any aid to religion
may inhibit people from their right to freely exercise their religion.
52. Id. at 48.
53. See id.
54. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause,
82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1113, 1118 (1988).
55. See infra Part IV.
56. See infra Parts II.B-D, III.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol11/iss1/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V11.I1.5

8

Un-Established Establishment
Clause: A Circumstantial
Approa 79
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
2004]Cook:
THEThe
UN-ESTABLISHED

Ginsburg follow the strict-separationalist line.17 Justice Kennedy adheres to the narrow viewpoint.5 s
These theoretical views have influenced the Court over the years.
Generally the Court has developed four tests in the Establishment
Clause area including the Lemon test, the endorsement test, the coercion test, and the neutrality principal. A further explanation of these
tests and their origin is required.
B.

The Lemon Test

The Lemon test, which originated in 1971, in the case of Lemon v.
Kurtzman,5 9 is a form of the broad view.6" The Lemon test is arguably
considered the operative test,61 but it is definitely the one met with the
most criticism, even from the members of the Court.62 The purpose of
the Lemon test was to confront three primary evils-sponsorship, financial support, and the government's active involvement in religious
activities.63 The Lemon test is a three prong test: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion"
and "finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.""
In Lemon, the Court, per then Chief Justice Burger, held that a
Rhode Island program that allowed the state to provide a fifteen percent salary supplement directly to teachers at religious schools who
were teaching secular subjects, and a Pennsylvania program that reimbursed religious schools in a similar manner, as well as provided partial reimbursement for secular class materials in those religious
schools, were unconstitutional.6 5 The Court looked to its previous Establishment Clause jurisprudence for guidance, and even it acknowledged that "[t]he language of the Religion Clauses of the First
66 It then derived the first two
Amendment is at best opaque ...
prongs of what is now known as the Lemon test, from a 1968 case,
57. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 867-68 (2000) (Souter, J., joined by
Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-90 (1992) (Kennedy, J., writing for
the majority applying the coercion test).
59. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
60. See George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 863, 878 n.81 (1988).
61. The Lemon test is considered the operative test because the lower courts are
still bound by it, because it has yet to be overruled. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (applying
the coercion test, but refusing to "accept the invitation of petitioners and amicus of
the United States to reconsider our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.").
62. See infra Part III.A.
63. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
64. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668
(1970)).
65. Id. at 607.
66. Id. at 612.
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Board of Education v. Allen, and the third prong from a 1970 case,
Walz v. Tax Commission.6 7 The Lemon Court found that both state
statutes met the first prong without a problem.6 8 The Court spent little time evaluating the second prong because it found that both statutes violated the third prong. The Court concluded that "the entire
relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive
entanglement between government and religion."6 9 The Court did,
however, acknowledge that some relationship between the government and the church was to be expected, 70 and that the "Wall of Separation" was really no more than a "blurred, indistinct, and variable
barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.""1 The Court still had to decide whether there was an "excessive
entanglement" of the government with religion. 7 To do so requires
an evaluation of "the character and purposes of the institutions that
are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship
between the government and the religious
73
authority.
The Court went on to describe the environment at the schools that
received state funding and concluded that the government's financial
support of such schools demonstrated an adequate entanglement of
the government with the state. 4
The Lemon test is very complicated; therefore, a further explanation of its three prongs-secular purpose, primary effect and excessive
entanglement-may prove helpful.
1. Secular Purpose
The secular purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether the actual purpose of the government in enacting the statute is to endorse or
condemn religion.7 5 The government's purpose to endorse religion
may be shown in two ways: promotion of religion in general,76 or "by
advance[ing] a particular religious belief."7 7 An example of a case
where the Court used this prong to strike down a state statute is Ed67. Id. at 612-13 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668
(1970) and Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
68. Id. at 613.
69. Id. at 613-14.
70. Id. at 614 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) and Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
71. Id. at 614.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 615.
74. Id. at 615-25.
75. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Justice O'Connor's interpretation
of this prong is also the foundation of the endorsement test. See infra Part II.C.
76. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985)).
77. Id. (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)).
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wards v. Aguillard.78 In Edwards, the Court held that a Louisiana
statute, which required teachers to read a disclaimer about "Creationism" before evolution was taught in public elementary and secondary
schools, was unconstitutional.7 9 The Court concluded that the purpose of the statute "was to restructure the science curriculum to conform with a particular religious viewpoint." 80 The secular purpose
prong focuses on the actual intent behind the governmental action by
asking whether" the action was designed to sanction or censure
religion.8 1
2.

Primary Effect

There is no case where the Court has struck down a statute based
solely on this second prong; 82 thus, the Court has not provided a clear
interpretation of this prong, nor a case to serve as an illustration. For
example, the majority in Lynch v. Donnelly,83 found that a creche displayed in the city's annual Christmas display did not have an "impermissible effect" that advanced religion; however, the Court described
the effect as "indirect, remote, and incidental" without setting forth
any reasoning as to why.84 Modernly, one is unlikely to stumble over
any case where the Court provides insight into the meaning of this
prong. The reason is because the Lemon test has undergone change
since its inception.8 5 The Court has collapsed the third prong into the
second prong, and at times, has even given them more of an endorsement test context.86 Thus, an in-depth discussion of the primary effect
prong of the Lemon test is unnecessary.
3.

Excessive Entanglement

The best case to use as an example of the excessive entanglement
prong is likely Lemon itself. Recall that the Court in Lemon held that
the statutes of two states that provided programs for the states to partially reimburse religious schools for their costs in teaching secular
78. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
79. Id. at 581-82.
80. Id. at 593.
81. See id. at 585 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)).
82. While the Fifth Circuit has interpreted this second prong, the Supreme Court
has not. See Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 346-48 (5th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251, 1251-55 (2000). Justice Scalia joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Thomas filed an interesting dissent from denial of certiorari.
Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
83. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). This case is discussed in more detail later at infra Part
II.C.
84. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
85. See infra Part III.A.
86. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-93 (1989); infra Part IV.
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subjects were unconstitutional. 87 The Court reasoned that searching
for an excessive entanglement requires an evaluation of "the character
and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the
aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority. '88 In Lemon, the Court reasoned, inter alia, that facts such as many of the teachers receiving state
funded supplements were nuns who were under the supervision of a
Bishop, and that the students were at an impressionable stage in their
lives, demonstrated a "substantial degree" of entanglement.8 9 Thus,
the excessive entanglement prong is analogous to a three-step inquiry
into (1) the nature and purpose of the organizations receiving the benefit; (2) the type of assistance provided; and (3) and the connection
between the religious activity and the State that is derived. 90
C.

The Endorsement Test

The endorsement test was first proposed as an alternative to the
Lemon test by Justice O'Connor in 1984 in her concurring opinion in
Lynch v. Donnelly.91 In Lynch, the Court was faced with the decision
of whether a nativity scene set up by the city, in a park owned by a
nonprofit organization, within a prominent shopping location, was
constitutional. 92 The majority opinion, which was written by Chief
93
Justice Burger, found no violation of the Establishment Clause.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor "[wrote] separately to
'94
suggest a clarification of ... [the] Establishment Clause doctrine.
She reasoned that there were two ways in which the government could
violate the Establishment Clause: one is the government being excessively entangled with religion and the other, and in her mind more
direct, is the government's endorsement or disapproval of a religion. 95
She claimed that these two methods of violating the Establishment
Clause clarify the Lemon test.9 6
Five years later, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,97 the Court, per
Justice Blackmun, adopted the endorsement test in holding that a
creche depicting a nativity scene hung from the prominent grand stair
case in the county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause, but
87. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971); see supra Part II.B.
88. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
89. Id. at 615-17.
90. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-93.
91. See id. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 671.
93. Id. at 687.
94. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Note that the second way suggested
by Justice O'Connor is the same "test" as the Court's interpretation of Lemon's secular purpose prong in Edwards. See'supra Part II.B.1.
96. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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that an eighteen-foot Chanukah menorah placed outside the CityCounty Building next to a forty-five foot Christmas tree did not violate the Establishment Clause.9" The majority acknowledged that it
customarily used the Lemon test, but then went on to name cases in
which its decisions were based largely on whether the government endorsed a particular religion.9 9 A strongly divided Court went on to
adopt and apply the endorsement test.100
It is not totally clear which viewpoint the endorsement test follows;
however, some statements of Justice O'Connor make it relatively
clear that it was not intended to follow the broad view.101
The endorsement test has rapidly gained acceptance by many commentators who credit it as being the preferred test; however, it still
faces strong, and worthy, opposition that will likely0 2prevent it from
becoming the sole operative test in the near future.1
D.

The Coercion Test

The coercion test was formally added to the slate in 1992.103 It is a
form of the narrow view.i ° It originated, officially, in Lee v. Weisman.10 5 In that case, the Court was faced with the decision of whether
school officials inviting clergymen to offer an invocation and benediction at public school graduation ceremonies was a violation of the Establishment Clause.10 6 The Court reasoned that, "[A]t a minimum,
the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone
to support or participate in religion or its exercise . . . "'I' The Court
held that the government's involvement in these school prayers violated this minimum guarantee.10 8 In so holding, the Court reasoned
98. Id. at 578-79. To be fair, it should be made clear that the creche probably
depicted aspects more analogous to what one would expect to find in a church than
from one hung from the staircase (arguably the most beautiful part of the courthouse), in that it portrayed the birth of Jesus along with the phrase "Gloria in Excelsis
Deo!" (Glory to God in the Highest); while the menorah was merely placed next to
the Christmas tree, a symbol which has been held time and time again to serve a valid
secular purpose. See id. at 580-85. None of these statements are meant to downplay
the significance of the Chanukah menorah, which represents a fascinating connotation. See id.
99. Id. at 592-93.
100. Id.
101. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he endorsement test does not preclude government from acknowledging
religion or from taking religion into account in making law and policy").
102. See infra Part III.B.
103. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
104. The coercion test, by its very nature, is designed to not discriminate among
various religions, but it does not require that the government be neutral either-only
that the government not be coercive. See supra Part II.A.
105. 505 U.S. at 587.
106. Id. at 580.
107. Id. at 587.
108. Id.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

13

Texas TEXAS
Wesleyan WESLEYAN
Law Review, Vol.LAW
11 [2022],
Iss. 1, Art. 7
REVIEW

[Vol. 11

that it was the principal, whose decisions are attributable to the State,
who decided that the prayers should be offered at the ceremony, as
well as who should offer them. 10 9
Apparently, by the principal deciding that an invocation and benediction would be offered, the State was "coercing" persons in attendance at the ceremony to "participate in religion or its exercise." 110
Further, by the principal choosing who was to offer the prayers, the
state was "coercing" persons in attendance to "support" a particular
religion." 1
Like the endorsement test, the coercion test gained some acceptance by commentators when compared with its counterparts, especially the Lemon test; however, the coercion test has likewise been the
subject of harsh criticism, slowing its expansion." 2
E.

The Neutrality Principle

As will be seen, the neutrality principle is somewhat of a perplexing
concept. Notice this section is entitled the neutrality principle, as opposed to the neutrality test. This is because it is a little confusing to
determine what exactly "the neutrality test" really is. For example, in
a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated, "[W]e have emphasized a program's neutrality repeatedly in our decisions .... Never-

theless, we have never held that a government aid program passes
constitutional muster solely because of the neutral criteria it employs
....,

Further, some writers credit neutrality as being the primary

test used early in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence," 4
while others speak of it as the possible up and coming test. 1 5 Either
way, the basic idea is the same. In the words of the Court, "A proper
respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses
compels the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion...
favoring neither one religion over others nor religious adherents collectively over non-adherents." '1 6

109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See id. This is an important point. An interesting question is whether the
principal's choice that a prayer would be offered is sufficiently coercive, or whether
the fact that the principal also chose who was to offer the prayer as well, was required
for the coercion test. The latter has a stronger correlation with the endorsement test.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. See infra Part III.C.
113. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.793, 838-39 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. Harvey, supra note 35, at 307.
115. See, e.g., Keith Werhan, Navigating the New Neutrality: School Vouchers, the
Pledge, and the Limits of a Purposive Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 603

(2003).
116. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994)
(citing Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyguist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93
(1973) and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)).
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Two cases can demonstrate this concept at work. The first is Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 17 and the
other is the more recent case of Mitchell v. Helms.118 In Rosenberger,
the University of Virginia's Student Activities Fund paid for various
expenses, such as the printing cost of student publications for student
organizations, but refused to pay similar expenses for a religious student organization's publication, and attempted to defend such actions
on the ground that doing so would be a violation of the Establishment
Clause."1 9 Miraculously, the majority side-stepped the Lemon test in
its entirety in holding that the university's argument-providing the
religious student organization with funding in the same way it does all
-other organizations was a violation of the Establishment Clause-was
without merit.1 2 ° The Court stated, "A central lesson of our decisions
is that a significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the
face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion."1 2 ' The Court found that the government program was neutral
because by funding the religious student organization in the same
manner it does all other student organizations, the university 1would
22
not be attempting to advance religion, or aid a religious cause.
At stake in Mitchell, was a governmental program that provided
funding to state and local governments, which would then lend educational materials and equipment to public and private schools.12 3 The
Court's plurality opinion found that the program did not violate the
Establishment Clause, reasoning that, "[If] the religious, irreligious,
and areligious [sic] are all alike eligible for governmental aid ....
[t]hen it is fair to say that any aid going to a religious
recipient only
1' 24
has the effect of furthering [a] secular purpose.
One interesting facet of the neutrality principle is that it is commonly applied to situations involving governmental assistance to both
public and private
institutions, particularly where those institutions
125
are schools.

117. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
118. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). The idea that this case is "more recent" is somewhat
misleading. The Court, in a plurality opinion, decided the case in 2000. Id. However,
the case had what Justice Thomas referred to as a "tortuous history," as it had been in
litigation for almost fifteen years. Id. at 804.
119. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 823-28
(1995).
120. Id. at 840. Lemon v. Kurtzman was mentioned only two times, both of which
were in the dissent, one of which was in a footnote. See id. at 882 n.8, 899. (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
121. Id. at 839. Note that the Court used the term "significant factor." Id. This is
an example of neutrality used as a principle, as opposed to a full test.
122. Id. at 840.
123. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plurality opinion).
124. Id. at 809-10.
125. See, e.g., id. at 801. The Court notes numerous cases which demonstrate this
trend. See also infra Part V.B.
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Now that the four major tests and their usages in cases have been
examined, Part III will discuss the tribulations to which they have led.
III.

PROBLEMS WITH THE MODERN STATUS

As mentioned earlier, perhaps the most significant problem with
the modern state of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
that there is no clear test, leaving the lower courts to face the dilemma

of what test to apply or how to manipulate one or more
126 of the tests to
ensure that the same result is reached under each.
The basic flaw is not a novel one. The tests each apply different
criteria, and therefore easily lead to different results. For example,12 7

if a city put up a sign outside its city hall, reading, "Worship this Week
at the Church of Your Choice!," the tests would likely yield different
answers as to whether such a sign violated the Establishment

Clause.12 8 Under the Lemon test, the sign probably would be a viola-

tion of the Establishment Clause because its "primary effect" is to aid
religion, even though not any one specific religion. 129 The endorsement test would likely lead to the same result, as the sign clearly en-

dorses religion in general. 130 However, such an act would likely
survive the less rigid coercion test, as it likely would not coerce anyone to participate in any religious act. 3 1 Lastly, a good argument
could be made that such an act would not pass the neutrality principle

or test because 132
the sign likely does not demonstrate neutrality toward
non-adherents.

A short discussion of the benefits and criticisms of each of the tests
follows.

126. See supra Part I. In the words of Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion
in Mitchell, "[T]here remains the question of which of the two irreconcilable strands
of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence we should now follow." Mitchell, 530 U.S.
at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127. This example and sample analysis is not the Author's own, but that of a prominent law professor in his outstanding student's study aid, which has kept many students afloat in Constitutional Law. See CALVIN R. MASSEY, ROADMAP:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 532-33 (2d ed. 2001).

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696
(1994) (citing Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyguist, 413 U.S. 756,
792-93 (1973) and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)). Professor Massey's
source, referred to in the previous footnote, does not express his opinion as to the
result under the neutrality principle; thus, the analysis in this part of the example,
unlike the previous ones, is this Author's own.
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A.

The Lemon Test

While the Lemon test is technically still the operative standard, as it
has never been overruled,' 33 and is definitely the test most relied upon
by the lower courts, 3 it has undergone many changes during its short
life.I3 5 For example, in Agostini v. Felton, 36 the third prong was collapsed into the second prong.1 37 The reason for this collapse is quite
simple-it is difficult to perceive a situation where a law would have
an excessive entanglement with religion but would not have either an
impermissible purpose or effect. The Lemon test, even as modified,
has been met with a plethora of criticism from the members of the
Court,'138 law students,' 39 and legal scholars.' 4 ° The criticism ranges
from slight criticisms, such as pleas to reconstruct the current Lemon
test into a more workable standard,' 4 ' to severe blows, such as now
Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement that the purpose and effect
prongs of the Lemon test (which are the only two left after the Lemon
test was modified)' 42 "are in no way based '1on
either the language [of
43
the Constitution] or intent of the drafters.'
It is likely that one could easily fill volumes with nothing but stark
criticism of the Lemon test. 44 In the interest of saving trees, it should
suffice to merely consider the following: the majority of the current
133. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (refusing the invitation to overrule the Lemon test).
134. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 9, at 1040; see also Danyll Foix, From Exemptions
of Christian Science Sanatoria To Persons Who Engage in Healing by Spiritual Means:
Why Children's Healthcare v. Vladeck Necessitates Amending the Social Security Act,
15 LAW & INEQ. 373, 402 n.191 (1997) (noting that most lower courts realize that they
must apply the Lemon test).
135. See infra Part III.A.
136. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
137. See id. at 222-23; see also Tobias G. Fenton, The Need to Revive the Role of
Legislative Purpose in Establishment Clause Cases, 83 B.U. L. REV. 647, 663 (2003)
(stating that "the most significant post-Lemon Establishment Clause case may be
Agostini, in which the Court formally restructured the Lemon test's second prong").
See generally Jeremy T. Bunnow, Reinventing the Lemon: Agostini v. Felton and the
Changing Nature of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 1133.
138. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 668 (1971) (White, J., dissenting)
(accusing the Court of "creat[ing] an insoluble paradox").
139. See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 35.
140. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses:
The Case of Church and Labor Relations and the Right of Church Autonomy, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1380 (1981) (arguing that the Court's choice in using the word
"inhibits" in the second prong of the Lemon test is contradictory to the Court's own
determination of the purpose of the Establishment Clause as well as to the Constitution itself).
141. See, e.g., Bunnow, supra note 137.
142. See supra Part II.B.
143. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
144. However, the Lemon test does have some supporters. See, e.g., Penny J. Meyers, Note, Lemon Is Alive and Kicking: Using the Lemon Test to Determine the Constitutionality of Prayerat High School GraduationCeremonies, 34 VAL. U. L. REV.231
(1999).
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Justices of the Supreme Court disfavor the Lemon test. The list of
justices includes Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, 4 5 Justice Kennedy, 4 6
Justice O'Connor,'147 and Chief Justice Rehnquist. 4 8 At the time this
observation was first made by the Court, there were actually1 49six justices, including Justice White, who opposed the Lemon test.
So why does the Court not wipe the slate clean and abdicate the
sour test? Justice Scalia may have hit the nail on the head:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up
in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once
again .... The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it
is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we
wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will
.... [W]hen we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it
entirely ... sometimes, we take a middle course, calling its three
prongs "no more than helpful signposts" . . . . Such a docile and
useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in
50 a somnolent
state; one never knows when one might need him.'
B.

The Endorsement Test

The endorsement test, while it has some flaws, seems to be the test
favored by many commentators 15 1 and some justices. 52 Justice
O'Connor has slightly modified the endorsement test since she first
suggested it, by stating that the question posed by the endorsement
test should be evaluated "from the perspective of a 'reasonable nonadherent.'" 53 In other words, to Justice O'Connor, the question is
whether a reasonable non-adherent of the religion of the religious
symbol in question would think that 5the
government is endorsing a
4
particular religious practice or belief.1
The test sounds like a winner, but it has been observed that these
reasonable observers may easily diverge in the way they respond to
145. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J. and Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
146. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-349 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
149. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Eliott M. Berman, Endorsing the Supreme Court's Decision to Endorse Endorsement, 24 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1990).
152. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., joined by Brennen and Stevens, J.J., concurring) (stating that "the endorsement
test captures the essential command of the Establishment Clause").
153. Id. at 620.
154. See id.; Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493
(1.986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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the messages sent by governmental actions. 155 One commentator has
pointed out, "Under the endorsement test, the government may not
express endorsement or disapproval of religion."15' 6 Many of these

governmental actions raise the most important, controversial, and
often litigated issues, and the endorsement test does not sufficiently
address them. 1
To Justice Kennedy, the endorsement test is too broad because it
gives no deference to historical practices, such as Thanksgiving Procla-

mations by the President (which date back to President Washington),
legislative prayer,158 and the phrase "God save this United States and
this honorable Court" which is used as an opening line before the
Court's sessions.1 5 9 Justice Kennedy went so far as to describe the

endorsement test as "a recent, and in my view most unwelcome, addition to our tangled Establishment Clause jurisprudence" and
that it
160
"is flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice.C.

The Coercion Test

Like the other tests the Court has used to answer questions arising
under the Establishment Clause, the coercion test does have its sup-

porters,1 6 but it also has its critics. 62 One criticism of the coercion

test is that it is unfair to religious minorities. 1 63 The big question with

coercion is really just how coercive is coercive. On one end of the
spectrum, there is Justice Souter's belief that, "[O]ne can call any act
of endorsement a form of coercion, but only if one is willing to dilute
155. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 115, 150 (1992).
156. Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment,13 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 341, 368 (1999) (citing, inter alia, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985)).
157. McConnell, supra note 156, at 150.
158. This is a practice that has actually been challenged and upheld, but exclusively
under the theory that Congress authorized legislative prayer at the time of the Bill of
Rights. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-88 n.10 (1983).
159. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 671-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
160. Id. at 668-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Scalia joined him in this opinion. See id. at
655.
161. See, e.g., Ralph W. Johnson III, Lee v. Weisman: Easy Cases Make Bad Law
Too-The "Direct Coercion" Test Isthe AppropriateEstablishment Clause Standard,2
GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 123, 178-79 (1993).
162. See infra Part III.C.
163. See generally Matthew A. Peterson, Note, The Supreme Court's Coercion Test:
Insufficient ConstitutionalProtectionfor America's Religious Minorities, 11 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 245 (2001) (discussing how the coercion test fails to address a
variety of establishment violations). But see Conkle, supra note 54, at 1151 (arguing
that "The Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine ... works largely to the
benefit of religious minorities and nonbelievers, because the [E]stablishment [C]lause
generally operates to invalidate government attempts to prefer dominant religions").
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the meaning of 'coercion' until there is no meaning left. ' 164 On the
other side is Justice Scalia, who one might say would almost require
the government to put a gun to someone's head, "The coercion that
was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion, was coercion of
religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat
of penalty."16' 5 However, Justice Kennedy, who is a coercion test enthusiast, takes a view that falls somewhere in the middle of the road:
[S]ome of our recent cases reject the view that coercion is the sole
touchstone of an Establishment Clause violation. .. . That may be
true if by "coercion" is meant direct coercion in the classic sense of
an establishment of religion that the framer's knew. But coercion
need not be a direct tax in aid of religion or a test oath. Symbolic
recognition or accommodation
of religious faith may violate the
1 66
Clause in an extreme case.
D.

The Neutrality Principle

A similar definitional question arises with the neutrality principle.
One confusing aspect of the principle is that it shares the same name
as one of the viewpoints. 167 However, the term "neutrality" has been
used in two very different ways. 168 To Justice Souter, "neutrality" is
representative of the broad view, evidenced by his dissenting opinion
in Mitchell, in which he would hold that all religious aid violates the
Establishment Clause. 169 However, to the plurality of the Court,
"neutrality" means only that the government may not discriminate
17
among different religions when providing religious aid. 1
These diverging views as to the proper meaning to be assigned to
key terms such as "endorsement," "coercion," and "neutrality" create
additional confusion.
IV.

THE NEED FOR CONSISTENCY

Even after reviewing all the criticisms of each of the individual tests,
perhaps the largest problem with them has yet to be discussed in any
164. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 623 n.5 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660-61 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. See supra Part II.A (the broad view is also called the neutrality approach).
168. Compare the plurality's view of neutrality with Justice Souter's view of neutrality in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). Also compare the majority's view of
neutrality and Justice Souter's view of neutrality in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639 (2002).
169. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867-68 (Souter, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 835-36. By the way, there is also a view that lies in between. Justice
O'Connor, who applied her endorsement test in Mitchell, would hold that the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that the provided aid was actually used for religious purposes (as opposed to Justice Souter, who claimed that the plaintiff need only show
that the aid could be used for a religious purpose). See id. at 857 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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length. One can be sure that any test the Court invokes will have its
opponents, but the key is consistency. Of course consistency, taken
too literally, could be devastating. For example, Justice Souter's proposed bright-line rule (which he, of course, believes is not his rule, but
a command of the Constitution) that no aid can be given to an institution that could use that aid for religious purposes,"' l is definitely one
that would assure consistency. However, the price for that consistency
may mean loss of an educational opportunity for students in private
schools. An educational opportunity is a purpose that the majority of
the Court has recognized as being validly secular.17 2
The Court is so inconsistent in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence that it seems that the test that will be applied is the one that can
muster five justices, or at least four justices for a plurality, to sign off
on it. The strong correlation between the justice who authors the
opinion, that particular justice's favored test or viewpoint, and the test
or viewpoint he or she chose to employ should be noted.' 73 Additionally, if the Court itself cannot decide which test to use, then it has
been known to utilize the lower-court-fix: apply them all!' 7 4
Moreover, what is worse is that the Court does not even apply the
same test in the same way. 175 For example, compare Justice Souter's
1 76
interpretation of "neutrality" with that of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Compare Justice Kennedy's analysis of coercion with Justice Scalia's
analysis,1 77 or Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas's view of endorsement with that of Justices O'Connor,
Souter, Breyer, and Stevens. 1 78 Furthermore, sometimes the same
justice will not apply the same test the same way.1 79 For example,
while Justice O'Connor claims the endorsement test gives great deference to the legislature, and that the Court's inquiries to the legislature
should be limited, she actually did just the opposite in several cases.'8 °
171. Id. at 867-68 (Souter, J., dissenting).
172. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
173. For example, if Justice O'Connor is writing, she is using the endorsement test.
See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). If Justice Kennedy is writing, he is
using the coercion test. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., writing for the majority). If Justice Souter is writing, he is employing the broad
view. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting). If Chief Justice Rehnquist is writing, he is employing the narrow view. See, e.g., id. at 643.
174. The Court has applied all of the tests in the same case. See Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
175. See infra Part IV.
176. See supra Part III.E.
177. See supra Part III.D.
178. See generally Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995) (exhibiting the differing views of the Justices with respect to the endorsement
test).
179. See supra note 174.
180. Justice O'Connor has stated, "[T]he inquiry into the purpose of the legislature
...should be deferential and limited." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (1985).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

21

TexasTEXAS
WesleyanWESLEYAN
Law Review, Vol.LAW
11 [2022],
Iss. 1, Art. 7
REVIEW

[Vol. 11

Thus far this Comment has focused primarily on the viewpoints of
the Justices of the Supreme Court. However, the inconsistency in the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence permeates far beyond the
walls of the Court. Lower courts are left clueless as to which test
should be employed, much less how to apply a given test. 181 For example, a district court in Indiana stated, "Plaintiff's first obligation is
to establish some likelihood of success on the merits of her challenge
...on First Amendment-Establishment Clause grounds. This is no
small assignment, given the profusion and confusion
reflected in the
1 82
case law and in Supreme Court precedent.'

Thus, before even the suggestion of a circumstantial approach,
which is discussed in detail in Part V, the Court must be willing, at the
very least, to treat the same test with consistency in its application, or
give a test that does not do so a different name. That, in and of itself,
might eliminate much of the confusion.
In addition to consistency in applying the various tests, the Court
must also aid the lower courts in deciding which test should apply to a
given situation. This concept is exactly what this Comment is about.
The need for consistency stems beyond the need for consistency in
application of a specific test, but also to the consistency in application
of which test. For example, the Fourth Circuit exclaimed:
There is little confusion over the general concept behind the Establishment Clause .... There is much confusion, however, about how
to apply this broad principle in specific cases. Traditionally, Establishment Clause cases have been evaluated using the Lemon test set
out in Lemon. In more recent Establishment Clause cases, however, the Supreme Court has employed several different tests
presented as either glosses on or replacements for the Lemon test;
therein lies the confusion as to the applicable standard." 3
The Fifth Circuit came across as almost defensive when it stated, "Our
multi-test analysis in past cases has resulted from Establishment
Clause jurisprudence rife with confusion and from our own desire to
be both complete and judicious in our decision-making."'8 4 Thus, the
need for a consistent approach seems to be as strong, or stronger, than
the need for a consistent test.
Finally, the last thing to cover before moving on to the circumstantial approach proposed by this Comment is a clear understanding of
the interrelationship of these tests. 85 On a view from afar, one can
However, in that very case, she did not give much deference to the legislature. See id.
Further, she joined the majority only two years later in a case that gave extensive
weight to legislative intent. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 (1987).
181. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
182. Kimbley v. Lawrence County, Ind., 119 F. Supp. 2d 856, 864 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
183. Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259, 264 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
184. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 1999).
185. See infra Part IV.
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almost see a hierarchical level of scrutiny that is being applied based
on which test is chosen. 1 86 For example, the coercion test, as applied
by Justice Kennedy, 8 7 seems to be part of the analysis of the endorsement test.18s The endorsement test, in turn, is part of the analysis of
the Lemon test's effect prong.189 That is to say, where a law or act
violates the Lemon test's effect prong, in that. it advances religion,
thtn surely such a law or act also endorses religion. If the law or act
endorses religion, then it probably also violates the coercion test, as
applied by the majority in Lee v. Weisman.' 90 While it may not always
be true, it seems that the three tests employed by the Supreme Court
to date can usually be lined up from the highest level of scrutiny to the
lowest as follows: Lemon, endorsement, coercion. As will be seen,
this phenomenon parallels another area of the Court's jurisprudence,
which 91may serve as a model approach to Establishment Clause
cases.
V.

1

WHEN THE COURT GIVEs

You

LEMONS, MAKE LEMON AID:

A

CIRCUMSTANTIAL APPROACH TO ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

A.

Introduction to the CircumstantialApproach

The concept of applying different levels of scrutiny to problems
arising under the Constitution is far from foreign to the Court.' 92 For
example, cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause are given
one of three levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or
rational basis review.' 93 The Court has set forth clear circumstances
to determine which respective level of scrutiny should be applied in a

given case: a classification based on a suspect class, such as race or
alienage, will receive the highest level of scrutiny. 94 Classifications

based on things such as gender, will receive intermediate scrutiny, and
classifications not falling within one of the other set categories (or cir186. See infra Part IV.
187. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (stating that "at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise").
188. In the words of Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in Lee, "Although
our precedents make clear that proof of government coercion is not necessary to
prove an Establishment Clause violation, it is sufficient. Government pressure to participate in a religious activity is an obvious indication that the government is endorsing or promoting religion." Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and
O'Connor, JJ., concurring).

189.
190.
191.
192.

See
505
See
See

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
U.S. at 587.
infra Part V.A.
infra Part IV.

193. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 9, at 1137-38.

194. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that "all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect").
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cumstances), such as disability or age, will receive rational basis
review. 19 5
While this system, like any other, has its critics,1 96 at least there is
consistency in its application. The lower courts know which level of
scrutiny to apply as soon as they determine what classification upon
which the challenged law was based. 9 7 While Equal Protection jurisprudence may not be perfect, it is far more fair than the Court,°as
Justice Scalia observed, side-stepping the Lemon test when it wishes
to uphold a law it thinks is just, only to revive it later to strike down a
law it thinks should be forbidden. 9 8 The varying levels of scrutiry in
Equal Protection jurisprudence were born out of the fact that racial
minorities (as well as other classifications such as gender) were undoubtedly subjected to disparate treatment throughout much of the
history of this country. 199 The Author submits that just as there are
significant differences among some classifications such as race and
gender, but not in others such as disability, age, or sexual preference, 00 there are likewise significant differences among various circumstances arising under the Establishment Clause. This concept has
actually been touched upon by the Fifth Circuit, "The decision to apply a particular Establishment Clause test rests upon the nature of the
Establishment Clause violation asserted."'
Because the different
tests used to determine whether a law or act violates the Establishment Clause are analogous to choosing what level of scrutiny should
be applied, 2 the Court should borrow this concept from its other jurisprudence by setting forth clear criteria as to when each test should
be applied.
The Author is far from a constitutional scholar; thus, any attempt on
his part to fully set forth all the circumstances which may arise and to
suggest the proper test for each would be speculative indeed. What
the Author does bring to the table is a little good ole fashioned common sense. What follows are some of the categories that have been
derived from the Court's jurisprudence, and a sample of how this cir195. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 643 (1996) (applying only rational
basis to classifications based on sexual orientation); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (adopting intermediate scrutiny for classifications based on gender).
196. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Factless Jurisprudence,34 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REV. 615, 615-17 (2003).
197. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985).
198. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
199. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
200. See supra Part V.A.
201. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 344 (5th Cir. 1999).
The court went on to exclude the coercion test from its analysis believing that "the
nature of the ... violation asserted" eliminated the need to apply the coercion test.
See id.
202. See supra Part V.A.
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cumstantial approach would work. The circumstances set forth herein
are not meant to be exclusive, nor the suggested test dispositive. For
example, numerous scholars have suggested alternative tests to the
Court's current list of choices. °3 Perhaps one of those tests, or one
that has yet to be developed, is superior to the ones chosen for the
circumstances that the Court may be faced with. This Comment will
use the tests as they stand at the time of the writing of this paper. The
purpose of this piece is not to develop a new and better test; it is to
establish a circumstantial framework that can be used to determine
which Establishment Clause test to use-the idea of circumstantial
line drawing. What follows is intended to serve as an example of the
idea at work.
The lines should be drawn wherever there is a substantial difference
between two circumstances such that those circumstances give rise to
the need for different degrees of scrutiny which should be applied to
the law or act at issue. The circumstances-or as the Fifth Circuit
might say, "the nature of the Establishment Clause violation asserted"42 0 -which will be discussed in this Comment are those which
have been recognized as categories in cases which give rise to an Establishment Clause question, including government aid to religion and
religious expression on governmental property. 0 5 These circumstances are discussed below, respectively.
B.

Government Aid to Religion

Government aid to religion has been a rather hot topic recently. 0 6
Government aid to religion is often in the form of government aid
provided to private institutions with a religious affiliation. 2 7 A common and appropriate way to divide this category is distinguishing between direct aid and indirect aid. 0 8
1. Direct Government Aid to Religion
A recent case dealing with direct governmental aid to religious private schools is Mitchell v. Helms.2°9 Recall that Mitchell dealt with a
governmental program that provided funding to state and local government, which would then lend educational materials and equipment
to public and private schools, some of which had a religious affilia203. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 34.
204. Freiler,185 F.3d at 344.
205. See, e.g., CHOPER ET AL., supra note 9, at 1036, 1072.
206. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (concerning vouchers
redeemable for a private school tuition of one's choosing, including religious affiliated
schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (concerning lending of materials to
private religious affiliated schools).
207. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. 639; Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793.
208. Members of the Court have made this distinction. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S.
at 649.
209. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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tion. 1 0 The plurality used the neutrality principle to interpret the "effect" prong of the Lemon test as it stood after Agostini.2 1 ' As Justice
O'Connor pointed out, however, it seemed that the plurality was really applying a straight neutrality test 2 12 under Chief Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of neutrality (i.e., neutrality meaning nondiscriminatory) .213
While it is clear that there is unlikely to be agreement among the
Court about the "proper" test to apply in this situation, 1 4 neutrality
215 Of
as applied by the plurality in Mitchell makes much sense.
course, it only makes sense to those who subscribe to the Chief Justice's view of neutrality, meaning that the government cannot discriminate among religions when it gives direct aid.2 16 Opponents may
argue that allowing the government to provide this aid has the effect
of reducing the private contributions made to those religious institutions that receive the aid from the government, or that individuals
should have the right to choose which religious institutions they wish
to contribute to, and by the government providing this aid, the choice
has been taken out of their hands. On the other side, there is the
argument that people in private schools should not be disadvantaged
as a result of inadequate funding for educational materials. For example, should students enrolled in a private school who would otherwise
not have access to a computer in their schools, absent support from
they
the government, be denied that educational opportunity because2 17
If
hold?
would
Souter
Justice
as
purposes,
religious
for
it
use
might
so, does that really matter? After all, they chose to go to a private
school instead of the public school already provided by the government. What if the public school system is so inferior that the gradueven read and write, or
ates of the public school system cannot 218
conduct basic mathematical computations?
There is a legitimate debate here. As promised, the Author will not
engage in a "this test is the best test" argument. However, one thing
must happen-the Court must be consistent in cases that raise this
issue. Whatever test is the most fair for the circumstance should be
applied consistently every time that circumstance is before the Court.
Because the neutrality principle was used here, it will be used as an
example of the circumstantial approach. All cases involving direct aid
210. Id. at 801.
211. Id. at 811-12; see also MASSEY, supra note 128, at 533.
212. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
213. See supra Part II.A.
214. For example, compare the opinion of the plurality in Mitchell with the joint
opinion and Justice O'Connor's separate opinion. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793.
215. See id. at 835-36.
216. See supra Part II.A.
217. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867-68 (Souter, J., dissenting).
218. This has happened in the Cleveland, Ohio school district. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).
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to religious organizations should be subjected to the neutrality test,
meaning that the aid must not discriminate against a religious institution, and must be equally available to all religious institutions. Otherwise, the next time a case involving direct aid is brought, a different
test may be applied, which would strike down such a program, once
again leading to inconsistency.
Additional subcategories within direct aid can be established. For
example, there is a difference between the higher-level education,
such as college, and elementary level education, in that students in
elementary school are at a more impressionable age.2 19 Further, there
may be a difference in the levels of religious schools-pervasively sectarian, primary or secondary religious schools, et cetera.2 20 But such
subcategories do not defeat the circumstantial approach. If there is
truly a substantial difference between the institutions, such that a
higher or lower level of scrutiny should be applied, then that subcategory is merely a different circumstance, and the Court should set
forth the test to be applied in that circumstance. If the Court is clear
in its line drawing of what gives rise to the categories it has created,
and which test a law in that category will be subjected to, then the
additional classification will steal no consistency away from the circumstantial approach-the lower courts will know how to deal with
the cases as they arise, and the legislative body writing the laws will
have the consistency needed to create laws or programs that conform
to the Constitution, and so on.
2.

Indirect Government Aid to Religion

There is a substantial distinction to be made between direct and
indirect aid, in that the power of choice resides in the individual as
opposed to the government when the aid is indirect; thereby alleviating the likelihood that the government is coercing, endorsing, or advancing religion.22 1
Not long ago, there was much debate about whether the government violated the Establishment Clause by providing private school
vouchers to parents of students, and allowing those parents to use the
vouchers to enroll their child in a private school of their choice, including religious private schools.2 2 The Court recently addressed just
219. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685 (1971) (stating that "[t]here are
generally significant differences between the religious aspects of church-related institutions of higher learning and parochial elementary and secondary schools" (footnote
omitted)).
220. This is a distinction recognized by Justice Souter. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 885-86
(Souter, J., dissenting). The plurality also made it known that it was aware of such a
distinction. See id. at 827 (plurality opinion).
221. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649-52.
222. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers Are Unconstitutional, and Why
They're Not, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Pun. POL'Y 397 (1999).
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2 2 3 In that case, the Court
that issue in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.

upheld the government program. 2 4 The majority employed a similar
neutrality-based approach as was applied in Mitchell-meaning the
majority used neutrality to ascertain whether the vouchers had the
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.22 5
Even though a similar approach was used, unlike in Mitchell, the
Court in Zelman was able to swing a majority.22 6 This is likely attributable to the fact that indirect aid places the choice to attend a religious
school or not, and if a religious school, which religion, in the hands of
the individual, as opposed to the government.
The rule from Zelman could fit into the circumstantial approach in
one of two ways. First, one could reason that because indirect aid
provides the element of private choice that direct aid does not, indirect aid should be subjected to a test that imposes a lower level of
scrutiny. Thus, an approach somewhat analogous to coercion would
seem appropriate. The coercion test, as applied by Justice Kennedy,2 27 in the circumstance of indirect aid generally, would ensure
that the government was not hiding a coercive factor wrapped in a
deceitfully labeled indirect program.
Another way the circumstantial approach could treat the rule from
Zelman is to use it as somewhat of a bright-line rule-all formally
non-discriminatory programs that provide indirect aid should be upheld. 22 8 Either way of looking at it, the outcome will be the same,
because an indirect program would pass constitutional muster so long
as it does not discriminate among religions.2 2 9 If an indirect program
had a hidden agenda to advance religion in some way, the first method
would catch it because the coercion test, as applied by Justice Kennedy, should strike it down.230 Additionally, the bright-line method
would catch it because it is not truly an indirect program if it does not
provide the essential element of individual choice.
223. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
224. Id. at 652.
225. Id. at 649.
226. See id. at 643.
227. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
228. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652 (stating:
[Previous decisions] make clear that where a government aid program is
neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad
class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the
program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause).
229. See id.
230. Recall that to Justice Kennedy "coercion" arising to the level of "[s]ymbolic
recognition or accommodation of religious faith" can be enough to violate the Establishment Clause. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660-61 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, if this symbolic recognition
or accommodation is sufficient, than surely a hidden religious agenda would be as
well.
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3.

Government Aid to Religion: The Circumstantial Approach
in Action

To put the circumstantial approach to work in this arena, consider
the current hot topic of charitable choice. Charitable choice is the
sizzling topic of today, much the way that school vouchers were only a
few years ago.23 1 Charitable choice is a term used to describe welfare
and social services offered through private pervasively sectarian
institutions. 3 2
If the program were direct, such as the government providing supplies directly to a certain charitable organization, then under the circumstantial approach, the Court should have no quarrel over which
test it should apply. Instead, it would merely recognize the program
as being one of the government providing direct aid and apply the test
chosen for that circumstance.
If the program were indirect, such as the government providing
vouchers to persons in need of the services, then the Court could use
either option discussed under indirect aid, and both would lead to the
same result-which would likely be that such a program would be upheld. If the first option were employed, the chosen test for this circumstance would be one that subjected the program to the lesser
scrutiny of the direct program-because the indirect program provides the element of individual free choice. When the element of free
2 33 If
choice is provided, the government's hands are clean of coercion.
the bright-line rule method for this circumstance were used, the program would survive as well, so long as it is truly provided the element
of private choice.
C. Religious Expression on Government Property
This is a large category and would likely have to be broken down
into more subparts than will be done here. To serve as an example,
religious expression on government property will be divided into two
parts: public schools and other government property. These sections
can easily be further subdivided.
1. Public Schools
How the lines are drawn will depend on whether there is a substantial difference as to how the cases that arise out of those circumstances
should be handled-meaning that the circumstances that are more
231. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Privatizationas Delegation, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 1367 (2003) (discussing the privatization of government programs and the prohibition from discriminating against religious providers).
232. See id. at 1384-85.
233. Coercion is being used as an example here because that was the test offered as
an example under indirect aid. See supra Part V.B.2. Again, the purpose of this Comment is not to offer a certain test for each circumstance, but to suggest the circumstantial approach, and show how it works.
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likely to contain holes, which in turn increase the likelihood of a violation of the Establishment Clause, should be subjected to a test of
greater scrutiny. Public schools can likely be split into distinct sub-

classes: the actual classrooms while classes are in session, and other
school related events-such as graduation and football games. 234 The

reason for this distinction is that class attendance, being mandatory
(more or less to some people), is different from students who want to
go to the Friday night football game. 235 The test applied to what occurs in the classroom should subject those actions to a higher level of

scrutiny than the test employed to regulate actions taken at a football
game.
Historically, the Lemon test has dominated religious expression in
public schools.2 3 6 Such issues range from mandatory Bible reading to
prayer at football games.2 37 The Court does not treat all classifica-

tions the same under the Equal Protection Clause, 238 nor should it
treat all laws challenged on Establishment Clause grounds the same.
Practices such as teacher-led prayer and mandatory Bible reading
should get the highest level of scrutiny.23 9 It makes sense that some

test (not necessarily Lemon), which affords a higher level of scrutiny,
should be used to address questions such as whether creationism must

be taught in conjunction with evolution. 24 0 But the same level of scrutiny should
not apply to high school football games; yet, the Court has
24 1
done so.

It may well be that lines within these lines are appropriate. For
example, a moment of silence law seems like it should be subject to
234. Each of these could be broken down further as necessary.
235. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 322-23 (2000) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). The Author is aware that the Court found that the prayer offered at
a football game under the circumstances presented in this case, was found unconstitutional under all three tests. However, as already discussed, the Author has left open
the idea that the test currently employed should be replaced by others. Further, the
Author is not suggesting that prayer should be allowed at football games, and is certainly not suggesting such under the circumstances as they were in Santa Fe Independent School District. Whatever test the Court uses, whether it is one already in
existence, or a new one, should be consistent. Such a test may consistently strike
down prayer at high school football games, as was done in Santa Fe Independent
School District. The point is that there is a difference between the classroom and a
football field, even if you live in Texas.
236. See, e.g., Edwards v. Alliguard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985).
237. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290 (applying all three tests); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.

421, 422-23 (1962) (dealing with Bible reading).
238. See supra Part V.A.

239. The Court has dealt with these before. Sch. Dist. of Abbington v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (dealing with teacher led prayer and Bible reading); Engle, 370
U.S. at 422-23 (dealing with Bible reading).
240. Edwards, 482 U.S. 578.
241. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290.
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less scrutiny than teaching the science of creationism.2 42 Prayer at a
graduation ceremony should probably get a higher level of scrutiny
than prayer at a football game because a student will only experience
graduation from that school once in his or her life, but the Friday
night football game is once a week every year during football season;
yet the Court has done just the opposite.24 3
2.

Other Government Property

Issues arising in this category often involve religious symbols placed
on government property, especially during the holiday season.24 4 Like
the cases in the public schools category, cases involving other government property should be broken down into subcategories based on
which level of scrutiny should apply. Again, the question of where the
line should be drawn is answered through a determination of the level
of scrutiny needed. It is not being suggested that the lines should be
drawn based on the religious significance of what is portrayed-it
would be absurd to say that a nativity scene's religious significance
changes. Rather, the lines should be drawn based on the location of
the placement of the nativity scene.
For example, there may be a substantial difference between the rotunda of the courthouse and a public park. A person may be compelled to enter the courthouse-for example, under subpoena-but
no one would be compelled to enter a public park. This is not to say
that there should be a lenient test for religious displays in a public
park. While one is not compelled to make use of a public park, he or
she should have the right to use that park without having to sit down
next to a nativity scene, or explain to their children why their family's
chosen religion is not represented in the park. A mid-level scrutiny
test-something analogous to today's endorsement test 245-would
seem appropriate, while placements in a courthouse would seem to
demand a higher level of scrutiny.
There is more to the distinction between a courthouse and a park
than merely the likelihood that someone would be forced to go there.
People may be more likely to associate the "position" the government
is taking as to a certain religion based on the location of the display.
A display in or around a courthouse may imply the impression of legal
meaning, while a display in a park would likely not carry such a
profound connotation. Again, these are just examples.
Some may wonder how a court can deal with all the possible circumstances in deciding what approach should be employed in all the
242. Compare Edwards, 482 U.S. 578, with Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
The Court applied the Lemon test in both cases.
243. Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (applying the coercion test),
with Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290 (applying all three tests).
244. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
245. See supra Part IV.
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varying situations. This is a worthy criticism, but one that the circumstantial approach adequately addresses. It is important to bear in
mind that when the Author refers to the circumstantial approach, the
terms "circumstances" and "circumstantial approach" must be distinguished. The "circumstantial approach" is the idea, the concept, and
the methodology recommended for how the Court should address issues arising under the Establishment Clause.24 6 In this sense, it may
be helpful to think of the circumstantial approach as being a "categorical approach," in which the circumstances-such as direct government aid to religion, indirect government aid to religion, religious
expression on government property, et cetera are thought of as categories. The "circumstances" are all the surrounding conditions and facts
of a given situation or case.2 47 The surrounding conditions and facts

of a given situation or case are not dealt with by the circumstantial
approach directly. The circumstantial approach is only a mechanism
by which a court knows which test to apply (analogous to which level
of scrutiny shall apply). 248 The circumstances of the actual cases
themselves are dealt with under the test that is employed because of
the circumstantial approach.
How the lines should be drawn has already been discussed.2 49 Of
course, the next concern that many would likely have is the amount of
time it would take the Court to set forth the test that should be applied in what circumstances. However, one should keep in mind that
any change to the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence will
likely take time. Even if the Court came up with another test to encompass all Establishment Clause questions, what is the likelihood
that the lower courts would apply it correctly?250 It took the Court
years to develop its Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.251 Procrastination not only delays the process, but it actually creates more
mayhem as the Court continues to twist and mangle its old Establishment Clause decisions by supplementing them with additional tests
and interpretations, which in turn lead to a set of unorganized deci'252
sions that the Fifth Circuit has describe as "rife with confusion.
The need for change in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is evident,
246. See supra Part V.A.
247. See THE NEW LEXICON
GUAGE: ENCYCLOPEDIC EDITION

WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY

OF THE ENGLISH LAN-

179 (1988 ed.).

248. See supra Part V.A.
249. See supra Part V.A.
250. For example, the Court had noted several times in dicta that the words, "under
God" in the Pledge are Constitutional; yet the Ninth Circuit completely ignored the
Court's dicta-a point that was acknowledged by the dissent. See Newdow v. United
States Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fernandez, J., dissenting), rev'd
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
251. In fact, it is still being refined today, especially in areas such as affirmative
action. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
252. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 1999).
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and continued hindrance of this change will only lead to further
perplexity.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is anything but established. 3 The approach currently taken to Establishment Clause
questions-the test that will be applied is the test that the most can
agree on today 254 -must change. While it is true that the test in any
case, involving any part of the Constitution, will always be the one
that the majority decides to use, the Court has set forth clear guidelines in other areas, 255 and should do so here.
The Court refuses to pick one test and stick with it. 256 But just picking a test, at least from the list of current candidates, does seem problematic because it would treat all circumstances as if they need the
same level of scrutiny. Some critics will likely respond that there is
only one Establishment Clause, and that it cannot mean different
things under different circumstances. It is not being argued that the
Establishment Clause means different things under different circumstances. For a response to such criticism, one need go no further than
the Court itself. The Court has blatantly stated that no one standard
is sufficient to interpret the Establishment Clause.2 5 7 Further, the
Equal Protection Clause, like the Establishment Clause, is only one
provision, yet the cases interpreting equal protection have clearly
drawn distinct lines among the circumstances presented.25 8 Whether a
classification made by the government violates the Equal Protection
Clause depends on the type of classification being made. 259 The
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause itself does not change. This is
similar to the nativity scene example discussed earlier.2 6 ° The religious significance of the nativity scene as a symbol does not change, no
matter where it is located. However, whether it violates the Establishment Clause might change based on location. This is a view that the
Court itself has specifically adopted.26
How the lines are drawn will depend upon whether there is a substantial difference as to how cases that arise out of those circumstances should be handled-meaning that the circumstances that are
more likely to contain holes, which in turn increase the likelihood of a
253. See supra Parts I, III.
254. See supra Part IV.
255. See supra Part V.A.
256. See supra Part I.
257. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
258. See supra Part V.A.
259. See supra Part V.A.
260. See supra Part V.B.2.
261. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598, 613-14 (claiming
one of the differences was that the creche was hung from the grand staircase in the
courthouse, while the menorah was only outside the City-County Building).
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violation of the Establishment Clause, should be subjected to a test
which affords greater scrutiny. The statement of how the lines should
be drawn is actually less complicated than it sounds. Good old-fashioned common sense can be a mighty ally. Common sense is all one
needs to recognize that there is a substantial difference between activities like teacher-led prayer or Bible reading in public schools, and
school vouchers provided to individuals who can choose which school,
religious or not, they want to attend.
Unfortunately, borrowing from Justice O'Connor's view and shaping the question of how the lines should be drawn as to whether a
"reasonable observer" would think that a higher level of scrutiny
should apply to a given law or practice 262 also comes with all of the
problems associated with who the "reasonable person" is. 2 63 For example, is the reasonable person a religious person or not? 2 6 If the
reasonable person is religious, then what religion is he affiliated
with? 265 If the reasonable person is a "nonadherent '' 266 to the religion
expressing the symbol or act in question, then similar complications
arise. For example, if the symbol in question is a Christian symbol,
would it not make a difference if the "nonadherent" were a Jew, Muslim, Atheist, or Satanist? Thus, the "reasonable person" standard
seems to be unworkable regardless of the approach taken.
However, drawing lines using common sense, such as recognizing
the inherent difference between direct aid and indirect aid-who
makes the choice, the government or the individual-would provide a
very usable framework for those who rely upon consistency in the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, while at the same time
affording the Court the greater flexibility it desires in approaching
questions raised under the Establishment Clause. The Court has said:
Establishment Clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and
we are divided among ourselves .... What is certain is that our
decisions have tended to avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches at either end of the range of possible outcomes.
This course sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility ....67
The circumstantial approach concept would provide this much needed
clarity and predictability while preserving the current flexibility.
The people, the legislature, and not to mention other courts, are
reliant on the Court's decisions. Without providing consistent guidelines, the Court has left its dependents in disarray.26 8 The Court
262. See id. at 620 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
263. See generally William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It,
" The Supreme
Court and Establishment,59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986) (providing a general direction
to the establishment inquiry).
264. Id. at 537.
265. Id.
266. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
267. Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
268. See supra Part I.
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should use common sense and look to the history of this country to
draw a clear and distinct framework for others to follow when interpreting the Establishment Clause-much the same way it has in its
Equal Protection jurisprudence 26 9-by drawing the lines at the points
where there is a substantial difference as to how cases arise out of
those circumstances should be handled. It would undeniably be a grueling process to obtain agreement from the current Court on where
the lines should be drawn. However, it is doubtful that it could possibly be any more arduous than obtaining agreement in cases arising
under the Establishment Clause with the jurisprudence in its current
state. In drawing these lines, the Court will be forced to answer the
question posed by Chief Justice Rehnquist almost a decade ago, "History must judge whether it was the Father of his Country in 1789, or a
majority of the Court today, which has strayed from the meaning of
the Establishment Clause. 2 7 °
David W. Cook
269. See supra Part V.A.
270. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Perhaps
the Court will decide some of these issues this term, as the Court recently granted
certiorari in a case where at issue was the religious expression on government property. See Van Orden v. Perry, 2004 WL 63551 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 346
(2004) (mem).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

35

